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SELF-INCRINATION AND THE TWO SOVEREIGNTIES RULE
JiM THOMPSON
"The public has a right to every man's evidence,"
said Lord Chancellor Hardwicke over 200 years
ago. This power of the state to obtain evidence, by
compulsory process if necessary, is the very founda-
tion of every criminal prosecution. It has, however,
been subject to various limitations developed
through the years by the common and statutory
law which recognize certain "privileges" against
the compulsion of testimony, e.g., the attorney-
client and physician-patient privileges. Courts
and legal scholars have long debated whether
legitimate policy reasons exist to justify the handi-
caps they place in the way of full and fair dis-
closure of the truth in court.' No privilege, how-
ever, has provoked the periodic examinations, the
"agonizing reappraisals" and calls for strength-
ening, modifying or abolishing the doctrine, espe-
cially in recent times, as has the privilege against
self-incrimination.'
This power to withold otherwise relevant and
I WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251 (3rd Ed. 1940),
McCoascK, EviDENCE (1954).
2 Inbau, Should We Abolish the Constitutional Privi-
lege Against Self-Incrimination?, 45 J. Crim. L., C. &
P. S., 180 (1954) and Giuswow, THE F 'ns _AamN-
MENT TODAY (1955).
Griswold says the fifth amendment has come to our
conciousness in the past few years and while it has
troubled many members of the, public, it is "one of the
great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself
civilized."
often vital evidence has not gone unchallenged by
the state. The practice of granting immunity from
prosecution as a means of obtaining evidence which
ordinarily would be witheld under a claim of
protection against self-incrimination is. nearly as
old as the privilege itself.3 As Wigmore has pointed
out,4 since it is the state which imposes a penalty
as the consequence of committing a criminal act
it is within the power of the state to take away the
penalty by law. If the authorities decide that
obtaining the testimony of a witness in a particular
case is more important than prosecuting him for
any offense he might have committed they may
grant him immunity from prosecution and thereby
obtain his testimony despite his constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination. 5 The im-
A good discussion of immunity statutes and their
history may be found in Rogge, Compelling The Testi-
mony Of Political Deviants, 55 Mica. L. Rxv. 163, 375
(1956-1957).
4 WsGMoR supra, note I at § 2281.
5 "Any evidence that he may give under such a
statutory direction will not be against himself, for the
reason that, by the very act of giving the evidence, he
becomes exempted from any prosecution or punishment
for the offense respecting which his evidence is given.
In such a case he is not compelled to give evidence
against himself in a criminal case, for the reason that the
legislature has declared that there can be no criminal
case against him which the evidence which he gives may
tend to establish." Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591,
604 (1896).
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munity granted must, of course, be fully conso-
nant with the protection he obtains when he
refuses to testify under a claim of privilege. 6
The fifth amendment protection against self-
incrimination was frequently claimed by witnesses
appearing in the many investigations into Commu-
nism in the United States which were conducted
by Congress in the early 1950's: Congress responded
to this mass use, and possible misuse, of a constitu-
tional privilege by those who would overthrow
the government which guarantees it by passing
the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1954. The Act
offered immunity to persons testifying before a
congressional committee, the federal courts, and
grand juries in cases involving the national security
or defense of the United States.
Since the language of the Act was similar to that
found in an immunity statute upheld by the
Supreme Court in a case some 60 years earlier
it was generally assumed to be valid.8 Any doubts
on this score were dispelled when the Supreme
Court, in the first case to arise under the Act, and
concededly a test of it, held the Act constitutional.
That case was Ullmann v. United States,9 decided
in 1956.
Ullmann, the petitioner, had appeared before
a federal grand jury investigating wartime espio-
nage and conspiracy to commit espionage. Asked
about his and others' connections with, and mem-
bership in, the Communist Party, he refused to
answer, claiming his fifth amendment privilege
against self incrimination. He was offered im-
munity under the Compulsory Testimony Act
but still declined to answer the questions and he
was sentenced for contempt of court. His appeal
to the Supreme Court alleged the unconstitution-
ality of the Act on a variety of grounds.
Most of the problems raised by the Ullmann
case have been considered elsewhere.10 One, how-
ever, presents a question having a significance
beyond the immediate application of the Act. Did
the Supreme Court, by its decision in the Ullmann
case, reopen to further examination the supposedly
6 The Supreme Court in Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892) laid down the test for a valid
immunity statute. It must be, the Court held, "a
complete protection from all the perils against which
the constitutional prohibition was designed to
guard ...
768 STAT. 745 (1954), 18 U. S. C. 3486 (Supp.
II 1954).
8 The earlier case is Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591
(1896).
9 350 U. S. 422 (1956).
10 Rogge, supra note 3 and Note, Immunity From
Self-Incrimination Under The Federal Compulsory
Testimony Act, 46 J. Crim. L., C. & P. S. 673 (1956).
well-settled federal rule that a witness in a federal
proceeding may not invoke the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination when the-
prosecution he fears is under state criminal law?
Ullmann contended that the immunity from
prosecution given by the Act did not extend to.
possible incrimination under the laws of a state.
If, in the course of his testimony concerning acts,
against federal law, the witness should be forced
to mention acts which were crimes against state
law he would be exposed to possible state prosecu-
tion. The fifth amendment required that he not
be forced to incriminate himself under either
federal or state law; he argued, the Act was de-
ficient in this respect, and was, therefore unconsti-
tutional. This contention was also raised in the
District Court." "The short answer to both ques-
tions," said that court, "is Murdock v. United
States."
Immunity From State Prosecution-A Retreat From
The Ride of Murdock?
The Mwrdockn case involved the question of
whether a witness testifying in afederal proceeding,
and with regard to a federal matter, could invoke.
his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation and refuse to answer a question on the ground
that his answer might incriminate him under the
laws of another jurisdiction. In that case the witness
refused to disclose the names of persons to whom
he had made payments which he subsequently
deducted on his income tax return. A truthful
answer would have disclosed that he had made the
payments to state law enforcement officials as
bribes in order that he might run his gambling
businesses unhindered. The Court held that he
must answer the questions because a federal inves-
tigation could not be prevented by matters de-
pending on state law and the fifth amendment pro-
tected only against disclosures which might lead to
prosecution by the federal government.
This is the "two sovereignties" rule. It embodies
a conception of two separate and distinct sover-
eigns, the federal government and a state govern-
ment, "acting separately and independently of
each other, within their respective spheres."
3
Under this theory a witness could not invoke the
fifth amendment in a Federal court sitting in
Illinois, for example, because his answer to a
question'might incriminate him under the criminal
laws of that state, and even though he would
11 128 F. Supp. 617 (1955).
" United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
13 Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1943).
19581
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certainly be subject to the jurisdiction of Illinois
and the danger of a subsequent state prosecution
might be very real. The amendment protects only
against disclosures which might incriminate a witness
under the laws of the sovereign-the federal govern-
ment-on. which it is binding. One sovereign takes
no notice of the operation of the criminal laws of
another and is not dissuaded from action by mat-
ters depending upon them.
Since the "two sovereignties" rule of the Mur-
dock case applies to the facts of the Ullmann case
as well, the contention of Ullmann that the im-
munity provisions of the Act did not extend to
state prosecutions was groundless, for under the
Murdock rule the immunity did not have to extend
that far.14 There would, therefore, be no need to
reach the question of whether the federal govern-
ment had the power to bar state prosecutions for
violations of state criminal law-an admittedly
grave constitutional question. This was the govern-
ment's contention in Ullmann.
5
Though the issue of the applicability of the
"two sovereignties" rule was squarely raised by
both Ullmann and the government, and though
the district court considered this the "short
answer" to the whole problem, the Supreme
Court did not mention the Murdock case, did not
discuss the "two sovereignties" rule, but went
instead to the second question and held that the
federal government indeed had the power to bar
state prosecutions for offenses against the state
which were disclosed by the witness while he was
under the compulsion of a federal immunity
statute. This was so, the Court declared, because
Congress had the power to provide for the national
defense. Federal immunity was a "necessary and
proper" method of carrying that object into effect
and was, therefore, the "supreme law of the land"
by which state courts were bound.
Sound though this holding may be, it cannot be
denied that it poses something of a threat to the
independence of the state judiciary in matters
heretofore considered to be within their exclusive
control. The federal government has supreme
power in many areas other than national defense.
Interstate commerce, bankruptcies, naturalization,
14 "The principle established is that full and com-
plete immunity against prosecution by the government
compelling the witness to testify is equivalent to the
protection furnished by the rule against compulsory
self-incrimination." United States v. Murdock, 284
U.S. 141, 149 (1931).
15 Brief for Appellees, pp. 31-33, Ullmann v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
the postal service, foreign affairs, and regulation
of U. S. currency may be mentioned. Immunity
laws may now be enacted to deal with the prob-
lems arising under these powers and their prohibi-
tion of prosecution can constitutionally extend to
the state courts.'
No Supreme Court Justice has been more un-
willing to decide constitutional questions when
not necessary to the decision of a case than Justice
Frankfurter who wrote the opinion of the Court
in Ullmann:
"In reaching out for a constitutional adjudica-
tion, especially one of such moment, when a statu-
tory solution avoiding it lay ready at hand, the
Court... disregard(s) its constantly professed
principle for the proper approach toward congres-
sional legislation."' 7
In the light of these conclusions, why did the
Court ignore the Murdock case when that decision
was dearly applicable to the facts in Ullmann?
Why did they decide a constitutional issue of some
moment when the mention of a case name would
have sufficed? It is submitted that the Murdock
case was wrongly decided and, because of the
Supreme Court's avoidance of the issue in Ull-
mann, the principle which Murdock laid down is
now open to question.u An analysis of the cases
16The problem is discussed in legislation, The
Federal Immunity Statute And Its Potential For Pro-
tecting The Witness Against State Prosecution, 16 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 61 (1954).
S
7 Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 37 (1948)
(dissenting opinion). And see Ashwander v. TVA,
297 U.S. 288,341(1936) (concurring opinion).
18 In Tedesco v. United States, 255 F.2d 35 (1958),
the appellant advanced the position that "the impact of
recent Supreme Court decisions has eroded the Murdock
doctrine," citing the Ullmann case. He argued "the
failure of the Supreme Court specifically to affirm the
Murdock doctrine in the Ullmann case. He argues that
the Murdock opinion was an easy answer to the issue
before the highest tribunal and would have made it
unnecessary to pass upon the constitutional power of the
Congress to grant immunity from prosecution in state
courts under state law."
The Sixth Circuit refused to accept this argument,
concluding that Congress had a right to extend pro-
tection to the witness beyond the minimum constitu-
tional requirements. If Congress undertook to do so,
the court reasoned, the Supreme Court in Ullmann did
not reach the question of whether it had to when it
considered the constitutionality of the grant of immu-
nity in state courts.
This view ignores the fact that at least one house of
Congress, the Senate, was extremely uncertain as to
whether it should, could, or did bar state prosecutions.
See 99 CoNG. REc. 4742-4743, 8340-8357 (1953).
"I think it is important... that we make clear that
this bill, at least, in the opinion of the Judiciary Com-
mittee and of its able counsel, would not grant to a
witness immunity from prosecution in a state court....
[Vol. 49
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which led to the adoption of the Murdock rule
is in order.
-At the outset it must be understood that certain
general principles govern the plea of self-incrimina-
tion. The decision of whether or not an answer to
a particular question will incriminate a witness is
initially one for the court. If it decides that it is
possible for an answer to incriminate, depending
upon what the answer is, it is for the witness, and
the witness alone,' to then decide whether he will
answer the question 9 A second requirement is
that the danger of self-incrimination be a "real
and appreciable" one. The search for truth by the
courts cannot be blocked by a remote and unsub-
stantial fear of incrimination."
The first American case to raise the question of
whether the fifth amendment allows a witness in
a federal proceeding to refuse to answer a question
which might incriminate him under the laws of
another jurisdiction was United States v. Saline
Bank." In that case the United States sued the
stockholders of the bank, which was unchartered,
and hence illegal under the laws of Virginia, to
recover a sum of money due the U. S. treasury.
, The stockholders replied that any answers they
So, Mr. President, I think that should be a part of the
REcoRD so that anyone reading the proceedings will
know exactly the legislative history of the measure and
the opinion of the committee on that point." 99 CONG.
REC. 4743 (1953) (remarks of Senator Kefauver).
In addition, the court in Tedesco conceded that the
words in the immunity bill being considered in that
case were identical to those of the Compulsory Testi-
mony Act of 1954 and "that Congress, in framing the
immunity portions... used the exact phraseology...
with the intent that the words so used should receive
the same construction." (Emphasis added.) And yet,
the court in Tedesco construed that Act (a narcotic
immunity law) as not reaching to the state courts,
whereas the Supreme Court, in Ullmann, easily con-
cluded that the other Act did. This is hardly the "same
construction" that Congress was supposed to have
intended.
The truth is that Congress made no rational choice
as to whether or not immunity from state prosecution
should have been granted by the Compulsory Testi-
mony Act. The legislative history of the Act makes this
clear. It is hardly any answer to say, therefore, that the
Murdock case was not decisive of the Ullmann case
because the Congress may undertake to give the witness
more than his due.
"9 This is the rule laid down by Chief Justice Marshall
in the leading case of United States v. Burr, 25 Fed.
Cas. 38 (No. 14,692e) (C.C.Va. 1807). An excellent
discussion of this case and others may be found in
Ratner, Conseguences Of Exercising The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 24 U. Cnr. L. REv. 472
A1957).
20 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), The Queen
v. Boyes, I B. & S. 311, 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (Q.B. 1861).
2126 U.S. (I Pet.) 100 (1828).
might give in the case would incriminate them
under the laws of Virginia. Chief Justice Marshal]
upheld this contention."
The question was not raised again until Brown v.
WalkerP The witness in that case, the first case to
uphold a federal immunity statute and the leading
case relied upon for the decision in Ullmann, ap-
peared before a federal grand jury investigating
violations of the Interstate Commerce Act. He
refused, although under a grant of immunity simi-
lar to that in Ullmann, to answer any questions.
One reason put forward for his refusal was that
the immunity afforded him did not extend to
prosecutions under state law. The Court held
that the witness's immunity did extend to possible
state prosecutions" and added, in dictum, that
the witness's fears of state incrimination were
groundless.2
"This case has been misinterpreted as one in which
the federal court was merely administering state law
and the question of incrimination under the laws of
another jurisdiction was not involved. Professor Cor-
win, Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction Of The
Sdf-Incrimination Clause, 29 MicH. L. REv. 191, 197,
n. 103 (1930) erred in this respect. And the case which is
perhaps the turning point in the law on this subject,
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), similarly erred.
"The case of Uniled States v. Saline Bank, 1 Pet. 100,
is not in conflict with this.... It is sufficient to say that
the prosecution was under a state law which imposed the
penalty, and that thg Federal court was simply ad-
ministering the state law, and no question arose as to
a prosecution under another jurisdiction."
A careful reding of the opinion in Saline Bank
shows that this was no prosecution. It was rather, a bill
in equity for discovery and relief filed by a United
States District Attorney on behalf of the United' States
Treasury to charge the stockholders of the bank with
liability for funds owed the Treasury by the bank.
Under the laws of Virginia, an unchartered bank like
Saline was illegal, and the Attorney General of Virginia
could have brought suit in a state court to hold the
capital stock of the bank in trust for the common-
wealth. The Court in Hale assumed that the proceeding
in the federal court was one which could have been
brought under the law of Virginia outlined above.
It was not, and the case must be taken as authority for
the proposition that a witness in a federal proceeding
is protected by the fifth amendment from incriminating
himself under the laws of another jurisdiction.
161 U.S. 591 (1896).
24 The actual holding of Brown v. Walker on this
point has been the subject of much confusion. Compare
Justice Frankfurter's statement on this point in
Ullmann, "We have already, in the name of the Com-
merce *Clause, upheld a similar restriction on state
court jurisdiction, Brown v. Walker ...." 350 U.S. at
436, with his dissent in United States v. Kahriger, 345
U.S. 22, 39 (1953) where he said that Brown v. Walker
held that the fifth amendment does not protect against
"the potential danger to that witness of possible
prosecution in a state court ......
25 Counsel for the witness claimed that in allegedly
granting freight rebates in violation of the Interstate
1958].
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The lower federal courts, in a series of bank-
ruptcy cases decided before and after the Brown
case, applied the principle of Saline Bank and held
that witnesses testifying in federal proceedings
need not incriminate themselves under state law.26
Thus the law stood, without a dissent, when the
case of Jack v. Kansasn was decided by the
Commerce Act the witness, who was the auditor of a
railway company under investigation "might have
received moneys for this purpose and not have paid
them over, and thus have been guilty of embezzlement;
he might have paid them by a forged check, and thus
have been guilty of forgery, or he might have been guilty
of murder, or burglary, or arson, and a statement by
him to the effect that he paid the rebates at a certain
time and a certain place would have proved him to have
been present at that time and place .... All these would
be crimes against the State of Pennsylvania, and any
testimony given by him might be used to convict him
in the courts of that State." (Quotation from appel-
lant's brief.) Grant, Immunity From Compulsory Self-
Incrimination In A Federal System of Government, 9
TEMP. L. Q. 57- (1934). The fact that the Court in
Brown quoted from the Boyes case in dismissing the
witness's claim of possible incrimination under state
law supports the view that the Court regarded this
claim as groundless as a matter of fact, for Boyes is
the leading case in the law with regard to the substan-
tiality, as a matter of fact, of self-incrimination pleas.
26 In re Scott, 95 F. 815 (W. D. Penn. 1899) involved
the refusal of a witness to answer the questions of a
federal referee in bankruptcy on the ground that his
answers would incriminate him in a pending state
prosecution for fraudulent insolvency. His defense was
upheld.
In re Feldstein, 103 F. 269 (S. D. N. Y. 1900) a
witness refused to tell the referee the reasons for pay-
ments made to him by the bankrupt on the grounds
that his answers would incriminate him under the
gambling laws of New York.
In re Nachman, 114 F. 995 (D. C. S. C. 1902) a
similar plea was sustained.
In re Kanter, 117 F. 356 (S. D. N. Y. 1902) the
bankrupt was allowed to refuse an order for a produc-
tion of papers and records which would have incrimi-
nated him in a pending state prosecution for larceny.
In re Hess, 134 F. 109 (E. D. Penn. 1905) the bank-
rupt refused to turn over books and papers which would
have incriminated him under contemplated state crim-
inal proceedings. "Can he, then, be compelled to
deliver their possession for this purpose, if, perchance,
they contain evidence that may tend to incriminate
him, and which might subject him to a successful
criminal prosecution either in the federal or state
courts? The privilege here invoked is found in the
fifth amendment... ." (Emphasis added.) The court
then held that ". . . it is plain that whatever incriminat-
ing evidence the books may contain could be used with-
out restriction in the state courts for the purpose of
convicting him of any crime for which he might be
indicted there, and, in consequence of this danger to
him, the plea of his constitutional privilege must pre-
vail." 134 F. at 111-112.
In re Hooks Smelting Co., 138 F. 954 (E. D. Penn.
1905) the bankrupt's president refused to answer
questions would would have incriminated him in a
pending embezzlement prosecution under state law.
199 U.S. 372 (1905).
Supreme Court in 1905. This case has been inter-
preted as applying an opposite rule from Saline
Bank and the law as enforced by the lower federal
courts at that time,2n but the case held nothing
more than that it was not a denial of due process
for Kansas to compel a witness to answer questions
relating to a violation of the state anti-trust laws
when the immunity he was given did not, and
constitutionally could not, extend to a possible
prosecution for violation of the federal anti-trust
laws. This was so, the Court held, because the
Supreme Court of Kansas had already held that
the witness could be asked no questions with
regard to interstate commerce and there was no way,
therefore, that his answer could possibly, as a mat-
ter of fact, incriminate him under federal law. "We
do not believe that in such case there is any real
danger of a Federal prosecution .... " This case,
the Court said, was like Brown v. Walker where the
danger of incrimination under the laws of another
jurisdiction was, in fact, only a "bare possibility"
and so "impropable" that no notice would be
taken of it.
The Court then added a dictum which later
courts have seized upon to support their view that-
Jack adopted the "two sovereignties" rule, and
indeed, the statement on its face lends some cre-
dence to that view. "We think," the Court said,
"the legal immunity is in regard to a prosecution
in the same jurisdiction, and when that is fully
given it is enough." That this was not an adoption
of the "two sovereignties" rule may be seen by
reference to two things: (1) the Court specifically
refused to qualify Brown v. Walker,29 and (2) the
Supreme Court, in Ballmann v. Fagin, an opinion
written by Justice Holmes just one month after
the Jack case was decided, held that a witness in
a federal proceeding need not testify as to any
matter which might incriminate him under the
laws of another jurisdiction.n° The authority cited
2 United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931);
Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1943).
2 "The principles underlying the provision itself
have beenthoroughly treated in the above cited cases
(one of which was Brown v. Walker) and it would be out
of place to here renew their discussion." 199 U.S. at
382.
30 200 U.S. 186 (1906). This has been criticized as
dictum, but it was actually an alternative holding-and
by far the stronger one. See 200 U.S. at 195. The witness
in Ballmann specifically relied on Saline Bank. See
200 U.S. at 188. The government did not urge the
adoption of any "two sovereignties" rule. It merely
argued that the possibility of state incrimination was
remote as a matter of fact. Jack v. Kansas was not relied
upon by the government to support its position. See
[Vol. 49
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by Justice Holmes in support of his conclusion:
United States v. Saline Bank and Jack v. Kansas.
These conclusions stamp Jack as a "fact" case-
where the court will look to see if the feared in-
crimination under the laws of another jurisdiction
is possible, as a matter offact-rather than a "two
sovereignties" case-where the court will take no
notice of possible incrimination under another
jurisdiction's laws no matter how real the danger
of that prosecution may be.
Then came Hale v. Henkel,31 a case which marks
the turning point in the progress of the law from
Saline Bank, where the witness was protected, to
Murdock, where the "two sovereignties" rule was
adopted.32
• Hale was called by a federal grand jury to
testify concerning the affairs of a corporation, of
which he was an officer, then under investigation
for alleged violations of the Sherman Act. He
refused to testify on the ground, among others,
that his testimony would incriminate him. The
Court Ied that the federal immunity statute which
applied to the Sherman Act protected him and he
could be compelled to testify. The Court noted that
the immunity clause involved was the same as
that under consideration in Brown v. Walker and
that Hale's contention was foreclosed by the deci-
sion in that case.n This holding seemingly disposed
of all the witness's claims of incrimination, both
200 U.S. at 192. If the Jack case had indeed adopted the
"two sovereignties" rule the government would surely
have cited that case as it would then have had a con-
clusive answer to the witness's contention rather than
one which depended upon a question of fact.
2 201 U.S. 43 (1906). The case is most famous for its
holding that a corporation cannot plead the privilege
against self-incrimination.
2 "Not until this court pronounced judgment in
United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, had it been
definitely settled that one under examination in a
federal tribunal could not refuse to answer on account
of probable incrimination under state law." United
Statis v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933).
m "Appellant also invokes the protection of the
Fifth Amendment.... The answer to this is found in a
proviso to the General Appropriation Act of February
25, 1903, 32 Stat. 854, 904, that 'no person shall be
prosecuted.. ." The court then applied the principle of
the Brown case which, it will be remembered, extended
the bar of prosecution to the state courts. "We need
not state the reasons given in Brown v. Walker, both
in the opinion of the court, and in the dissenting opinion,
wherein all the prior authorities were reviewed, and a
conclusion reached by a majority of that court, which
fully covers the case under consideration." (Emphasis
added.) It will also be remembered that the Court in the
Brown case dismissed the witness's claim of possible
state prosecution only because it was, in fact, not a
substantial one.
state and federal,3 but the Court then went on to
adopt the "two sovereignties" rule. The only
danger to be considered, the Court said, was that
arising under the laws of one sovereign.3 5
u justice Brewer, dissenting, said that he "fully
agreed" with the majority's proposition that "the
immunity granted by the Federal statute is sufficient
protection against both the Nation and the several
states. .. ."
3 It may be contended that what the Court said
about "two sovereignties" was only dictum, but
regardless of this, it is submitted that be it dictum or
holding it was bad law. The defendant's counsel was of
the opinion that federal immunity would extend to the
state courts under the rule of Brown and Jack but
argued that such an extension was unconstitutional
under the tenth amendment. See 201 U.S. at 50. The
government relied on the Brown case and contended
that the witness was immune from state prosecution.
See 201 U.S. at 57 and Grant, supra note 24. Neither
side argued "two sovereignties" and both were clearly of
the opinion that there was no question of its application.
The Court, however, was of the opinion that the argu-
ment of possible incrimination under the laws of the
state where the federal investigatory body was sitting
was unsound. "Indeed, if the argument were a sound
one it might be carried still further and held to apply
not only to state prosecutions within the same jurisdic-
tion, but to prosecutions under the criminal laws of
other States to which the witness might have subjected
himself." This was a clear repudiation of Ballmann v.
Fagin, where the state incrimination feared was that
under the laws of Ohio-the state in which the federal
grand jury in that case was sitting. Curiously enough,
Justice Holmes, who wrote the opinion in Ballmann did
not dissent in Hale v. Henkd.
"The question has been fully considered in England,
and the conclusion reached by the courts of that coun-
try that the only danger to be considered is one arising
within the same jurisdiction and under the same
'sovereignty. Queen v. Boyes, I B. & S. 311; King of
the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 7 State Trials (N.S.), 1049,
1068; State v. March, 1 Jones (N. Car.) 526; State v.
Thomas, 98 N. Car. 599."
Queen v. Boyes is no authority for the "two sov-
ereignties" rule. Far from it, is the leading case for the
proposition that incrimination feared must be sub-
stanial in fact and underles the Saline Bank, Brown,
Jack, and Ballmann cases.
Queen v. Boyes was a bribery prosecution. The govern-
ment called as a witness one of the election officials
bribed by the defendant. He refused to testify on the
ground of self-incrimination. The government then
procured a pardon for the witness. He still declined to
testify, however, on the ground that, while the pardon
stayed all ordinary legal proceedings, it did not protect
him against a possible impeachment proceeding in the
House of Commons. This fear, said the court, was
simply ridiculous.
"Now, in the present case, no one seriously supposes
that the witness runs the slightest risk of an impeach-
ment by the House of Commons. No instance of such a
proceeding in the unhappily too numerous cases of
bribery which have engaged the attention of the
House of Commons has every occurred, or, so far as we
are aware, has ever been thought of.... (This prose-
cution) was undertaken by the Attorney General by
the direction of the House itself .... It appears to us,
therefore, that the witness in this case was not, in a
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The Supreme Court may have adopted the "two
sovereignties" rule in Hale but the lower federal
courts went right on deciding cases as if they had
never heard of that decision. Pleas of possible
incrimination under the laws of another jurisdicton
were continually sustained on the Saline Bank and
Ballman principles until the very eve of the Mur-
dock decision.3 6 Moreover, the Supreme Court
rational point of view, in any the slightest real danger
from the evidence he was called upon to give when
protected by the pardon from all ordinary legal pro-
ceedings; and that it was therefore the duty of the
presiding Judge to compel him to answer." 121 Eng.
Rep. at 738.
It is true that the King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox,
1 Simon (n.s.) 301, 61 Eng. Rep. 116 (Ch. 1851)
supports the "two sovereignties" rule. It must be noted,
however, that the result was reached only because of
decisive factual considerations in the case. The witness
refused to testify on the ground that his answers would
incriminate him under the laws of Sicily. The court
held this to be no bar.
"... [Ifn the absence of all authority on the point, that
the rule of protection is confined to what may tend to
subject a party to penalties by our own laws ......
(Emphasis added.) 61 Eng. Rep. at 128.
In this case the specific laws of Sicily which the
witness feared were not pointed out to the court. The
witness merely alleged that he would be "subject to
criminal prosecution, punishment, and penalties in
Sicily." This lack of evidence as to the specific laws of
the other jurisdiction involved was probably fatal, as
the court pointed out in such a case "No judge can
know, as a matter of law, what would or what would
not be penal in a foreign country, and he cannot, there-
fore, form any judgment as to the force or truth of the
objection of a witness when he declines to answer on
such a ground." Moreover, the court said, there was no
obligation on the part of the defendants to subsequently
subject themselves to the jurisdiction of Sicily.
Authority on this point was not long in coming. And
when it came it overruled King of the Two Sicilies. In
United States of America v. McRae [1867] L.R. 3 Eq.
79, the court upheld the refusal of a witness in an Eng-
lish court to answer any questions when the answers
might subject property belonging to the witness, and
situated in the United States, to forfeiture under the
laws of that country. While the court recognized that
the King case might have been correctly decided on its
peculiar facts, it specifically disapproved of any general
application of the "two sovereignties" rule.
The question had indeed been "fully considered" in
England but the "conclusion reached by the courts of
that country" was exactly contrary to the "two
sovereignties" rule laid down in Hale v. Henkel.
The two North Carolina cases cited by the Court
may be similarly dealt with. The first, State v. March,
46 N.C. 526 (1854) is a "two sovereignties" case, but
the later case decided by the North Carolina Supreme
Court, State v. Thomas, 98 N.C. 599 (1887) expressly
rejected the "two sovereignties" rule of the March
case and declined to follow it. The rule had been re-
pudiated in North Carolina, therefore, before it was
cited as good authority by Hale.
36 In United States v. Lombardo, 228 F. 980 (W. D.
Wash. 1915) the defendant was prosecuted for failure
to register the names of alien women kept for purposes
itself was apparently unsure of the correctness of
the decision in Hae for it specifically left the ques-
tion open in a case decided some twenty one years.
laterY
Efforts have been made to reconcile Hale with
the earlier cases of Saline Bank and Baflmann by
pointing out that the witness in Hale was, after-
all, in no real danger of state prosecution and it.
cannot be said that the Court in Hale would have-
decided the case the way it did if there had been a.
substantial danger of incrimination under state-
law.w This theory, even if accepted as true, is.
unavailing however, because the Murdock decision:
squarely applies the "two sovereignties" rule to a.
case where the danger of incrimination under the-
law of the state was very great. In fact, the answers-
to the questions asked would probably have been
enough, standing alone, to convict him of a crime-
in the state courts.39
This analysis of the federal cases reveals, there-
of prostitution. Immunity from federal prosecution was.
offered to those complying with the regulation provi-
sions. The court held that the defendant did not have
to register because to do so would have subjected her to
possible prosecution under a law of the state of Wash-
ington which forbade the maintenance of a house of
prostitution. This decision was affirmed on another
ground by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73 (1916). It is interesting to note
that four Justices who participated in the Lombardo
decision were also members of the Court which decided
Hale v. Henkel. The effect of this affirmance, of course,
was to leave standing a lower court decision, one
ground of which was contrary to Hale.
Pleas of possible state prosecution were also upheld.
In re Gasteiger, 290 F. 410 (E. D. N. Y. 1923) and in
Buckeye Powder Co. v. Hazard Powder Co., 205 F.
827 (D. C. Conn. 1913).
In re Doyle, 42 F.2d 686 (S. D. N. Y. 1930), decided
one year before the Murdock case, a similar plea was
upheld. The court discussed the prior Supreme Court
decisions. In Brown v. Walker, it said, the immunity
extended to the state courts. The same was true of
Hale v. Henkel and the apparent adoption by the Su-
preme Court of the "two sovereignties" rule was
dictum. Jack v. Kansas was a "fact" case. The court
would follow Ballmann and Saline Bank.
3 United States ex rel Vajtauer v. Commissioner of
Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927).
38 See Rogge, supra at note 3.
The lower court opinion in this case, United States
v. Murdock, 51 F.2d 389, 391 (S. D. Ill. 1930) makes
this clear.
"The witness admitted he had been interested in the
operation of slot machines in Madison county; that he
had paid money to certain persons, which he had de-
ducted as an expense of his business in the income tax
returns. The inference is quite clear that this money was
paid to cettain persons to procure protection from crimi-
nal prosecution by reason of defendant's illegal enter-
prises. The witness was asked to give the names of the
persons to whom the money was given, and the purpose
for which it was given."
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fore, that prior to the Murdock decision, not one
federal court, including the Supreme Court, had
ever forced a witness in a federal proceeding to
incriminate himself under state law when the
danger of state incrimination was substantial.
Murdock stands alone.
Legal comment was, on the whole, favorable to
the Murdock case,40 and Wigmore's wholehearted
support of the "two sovereignties" rule was un-
doubtedly a factor here.' In the twentyone years
since the decision was made, however, the "two
sovereignties" rule has come under sharp attack. 
4
The latest decisions of the state courts con-
struing state immunity statutes have repudiated
the rule in Murdock and have returned to the fact
test of Jack v. Kansas.4 This trend is significant,
40 Note, 45 HARv. L. Ruv. 595 (1932).
41Wigmore pointed out that "In Samoa it was ta-
booed to name a deceased chieftain by the title he bore
when living" and in Massachusetts "to sell cigars on
Sunday" was once a crime. "Are the Courts of our
various Commonwealths to ... catalogue within the
rubrics of criminality every act which is anywhere,
under, any system of manners, morals, or policy,
stigmatized by law?" he asked. 8 WIGmorE, EVIDENCE
§ 2258 (3rd Ed. 1940).
42Rogge, Compelling The Testimony Of Political
Deviants, 55 Micn. L. REv. 163, (1957), and see Grant,
Immunity From Compulsory "Self-Incrimination In A
Federal System Of Government, 9 Txm,. L. Q. 57 (1934),
Grant, Federalism and Self-Incrimination, 4,5 U. C. L. A.
L. REv. 549, 1 (1957-58), by an author who has been
the voice crying in the wilderness against the "two
sovereignties" doctrine for twenty-three years.
4
3Doran v. Doran, 215 La. 151, 39 So.2d 894 (1949)
distinguishes the federal authority on a fact basis.
Adopts the fact test of Jack.
In re Carchietta, 124 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1953) says the
Murdock rule is in effect in New York except when the
defendant can "substantiate his claim by evidence that
the danger of prosecution is not remote and unsubstan-
tial, but real and substantial. He may show this by
evidence of the commencement, or the actual pendency,
of a criminal prosecution in a foreign jurisdiction, or
by other equally cogent evidence."
People v. Den Uyl, 318 Mich. 645, 29 N.W.2d 284
(1947).
"We are of the opinion that the privilege against self-
incrimination exonerates from disclosure whenever there
is a probability of prosecution in State or federal
jurisdictions.... It seems like a travesty on verity to
say that one is not subjected to self-incrimination when
compelled to give testimony in a State judicial pro-
ceeding which testimony may forthwith be used against
him in a Federal criminal prosecution." 29 N.W.2d at
287.
State ex rel Mitchell v. Kelly, - Fla.- , 71 S.2d
887 (1954) decides the question for the first time in
Florida and follows the Den Uyl case.
The latest state case is Commonwealth v. Rhine,
303 S.W.2d 301, 304 (Ky. 1957).
"We believe that to render effective the ... Consti-
tutional provision against self-incrimination, it is
essential that it apply to prosecutions by the United
States as well as those by the Commonwealth. To hold
because it was essentially for the protection of the
state courts and state immunity statutes that the
Murdock rule was intende&"
The question of the soundness of the "two
sovereignties" rule is an important one today.
Whatever may have been said in support of the
rule in the past is open to question today when
federal investigations are likely to have as one of
their objects the speciic purpose of exposing viola-
tions of state criminal law. The Kefauver Commit-
tee investigation of a few years ago is an example.
The Committee's authorizing resolution gave it
authority to "make a full and complete study and
investigation of whether organized crime utilizes
the facilities of interstate commerce... in further-
ance of any transactions which are in violation of
the law.., of the state in which the transactions
occur .... 45
One lower federal court has sought to escape
from the harsh results of an application of the
Murdock rule in these circumstances. United Stales
v. DiCarlo46 was a contempt of Congress prosecu-
tion. The defendant had been a witness before the
Kefauver Committee and had been asked ques-
tions concerning violations of state criminal lawY
He refused to answer the questions. The govern-
ment cited the Murdock rule in DiCarlo's contempt
trial but the district court distinguished MuLrdock.
The Supreme Court had specifically pointed out in
that case that nothing of state concern was in-
volved, that the questions were in relation to
federal income tax matters, and that while the
answers might have incriminated the witness
under state law they did so only incidentally. This
was not the case in DiCarlo, said the district court,
otherwise would be to ignore the fact that our citizens
are in a very real sense, as well as in a technical one,
citizens of both the State of Kentucky and of the
United States. The jurisdiction of both governments is
coextensive."
See the favorable comments on this case: Recent
Cases, 106 U. PA. L. Ruv. 127 (1957), Recent Cases,
11 VAND L. REv. 199 (1957), Recent Cases, 46 Ky. L. J.
281 (1958).
4The argument is-that no state could enact a valid
immunity law if the "two sovereignties" rule were not
recognized because no state can constitutionally give
immunity against federal prosecution. Jack v. Kansas,
200 U.S. 186 (1905). The state cases construing the
state immunity statutes have held, however, that only
those specific questions which may lead to federal
incrimination are bad.
45 S. REs. 202, 81st Cong., 2d Ses., 96 CONG. Rxc.
6246 (1950).
'4 102 F.'Supp. 597 (N. D. Ohio 1952).
47 Whether or not he had engaged in the slot machine
and gambling businesses in New York. -
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for there the questions were specifically directed to
offenses against state law. The witness was ac-
quitted of contempt.41
The DiCarlo decision has been criticized as an
attempt by the district court to overrule the Mur-
dock case;49 it has also been praised as a just and
logical exception to the Murdock rule.w The differ-
ence between the situation in Murdock and that in
DiCarlo is more apparent than real. If the "two
sovereignties" rule is sound it should make no
difference in law whether the question is specifi-
cally directed at a disclosure of a violation of state
law or the violation is only elicited incidentally in
an answer to a question primarily concerning a
federal matter.
To say that a case is founded on a misapprehen-
sion of earlier cases and finds support only in the
dictum of some of them, while it may weakefi the
force of the case, does not destroy it or prove its
incorrectness. The Supreme Court was free, in the
Murdock case, to adopt the "two sovereignties"
rule if it saw fit to do so. Any further criticism of
that case must involve, therefore, an examination
of the merits of the rule. These have been con-
sidered, to some extent, in the previous discussion.
The strongest argument that may be mustered
in support of the Murdock rule is that federal
investigations should not be hampered by matters
depending upon the criminal laws of the forty-
eight states. This is not a valid argument, however,
and the proof of it may be seen in the fact that
the Murdock rule is not being enforced at the federal
investigative level today. Witnesses appearing before
the McClellan Committee, a committee of the
United States Congress engaged in an investiga-
tion of improper activities in the labor and manage-
ment field, have refused to testify and have in-
voked the fifth amendment on the grounds that
any answers they might give would incriminate
them under various state criminal laws. Most were
then under indictment in state courts. These
refusals were upheld by the Committee and its
counsel."
Is "In the light of its facts and the reasoning of the
court, the binding effect of the Murdock case cannot be
extended to cases, where, in the exercise of the over-
lapping jurisdiction of the Federal government, a Con-
gressional committee enters upon investigations of state
crimes. But in the search for the principle that ought to
govern in such cases, United States v. Saline Bank,
supra, may be accepted as a guide." 102 F. Supp. at
605.
49 Comment, 4 STAN. L. Rxv. 594 (1952).
6 Note, 66 HAnv. L. REv. 186 (1952).
51 Analytical Report, The McClellan Committee
It is unjust to require a witness under the juris-
diction of the federal government to incriminate
himself under state law when a witness cannot be
subject to federal jurisdiction without being sub-
ject, at the same time, to the jurisdiction of a
state. Federal investigations nowadays are often
specifically directed at violations of state criminal
laws. Federal and state prosecutors work hand in
hand when a criminal case presents both federal
and state aspects.u Under these circumstances,
it is indeed a "traversty on verity" to say that a
witness has received the full protection of the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion when he has been granted immunity from
federal prosecution alone."
Hearing-1957, The Bureau of National Affairs,
Inc. (1958).
At p. 5: "Maloney explained that his reason for
refusing to answer questions was that he is under
indictment in Washington on charges of violating state
laws and conspiracy to violate them."
At p. 12: "The second alleged conspirator sum-
moned to testify was Joseph P. McLaughlin, identified
by the Committee as a Seattle gambler... He invoked
the Fifth and 14th Amendments when asked if the
Teamster Union ever paid any of his bills, explaining
that he is under indictment on 'eight or nine' counts in
Portland charging gambling and conspiracy."
At p. 92: "All refused to answer questions on the
ground that they are under criminal indictment in
Lackawanna County on charges allegedly arising out
of union activity."
Like the Kefauver investigation, specific violations of
state law were apparently being sought by the Commit-
tee in some instances. The authorizing resolution
provided that "there is hereby established a select
committee which is authorized and directed to conduct
an investigation and study of the extent to which
criminal or other improper practices or activities are,
or have been engaged in the field of labor-management
relations...." S. REs. 74, 85, Cong., 1st Sess., 103
CONG. REc. 1264 (1957).
Appendix 10 at p. 449: "The Committee has thus
far determined that there are at least 11 fields of major
investigation that should be covered. They are:.. (6)
Extortion and robbery... (8) Violence. ..."
52 A federal grand jury in Chicago was investigating
an alleged attempt to bribe a federal official. A Chicago
municipal judge was called as a witness before the grand
jury and reportedly invoked the fifth amendment. When
the federal grand jury returned a no bill the federal
district attorney, Robert Tieken, announced that "I
will turn over everything we have to the State's
Attorney's office." The State's Attorney for Cook
County said he would receive the evidence and docu-
ments and that "If it means what I think it does, I'll
take it to the county grand jury."
The county grand jury later indicted the witness. See
Chicago Daily Tribune, October 18, 1957, pt. 1, p. 9,
and October 19, 1957 pt. 1, p. 4.
53 See Marcello v. United States, 196 F.2d 437, 442
(5th Cir. 1952). "The doctrine (two sovereignties) is so
strongly entrenched that it appears as futile to protest
as it is to expect an individual to feel that his constitu-
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Much confusion has resulted in these cases from
attempts to apply the self-incrimination provision
of the fifth amendment to state action or to bring
it in the back door through the fourteenth. The
first has been unavailing since Barron v. Balti-
more," and the second was rejected in Twining v.
New Jersey.n
A recent case illustrates the difficulties which
notions of "federalism" and "two sovereignties"
have caused in this field. In Knapp v. Schweitzer'8
the petitioner was a witness before a state grand
jury. He was offered immunity from state prosecu-
tion. He refused to answer questions for fear of
incrimination under federal law, claiming the
privilege of the fifth amendment. This same argu-
ment was put forward and rejected in Jack v.
Kansas. This was recognized by Justice Frank-
furter, speaking from the majority,- but he also
seized upon the chance to add, in dictum, that
"The sole-although deeply valuable purpose
of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination is the security of the indivudial
against the exertion of the power of the Federal
government to compel incriminating testimony
with a view to enabling that same Government to
convict a man out of his own mouth." (Emphasis
added.)
The first part of this statement, that the fifth
amendment binds only the federal government,
is undoubtedly correct;- the second part, that
the government which compels must be the same
as that which convicts finds no support in the lan-
guage of the Constitution. 59
Justice Frankfurter then re-affirms'0 the Mur-
dock doctrine:
tional privilege has been safeguarded because the
penitentiary into which his answer may land him is
under the supervision of the state instead of the federal
government."
"32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
' 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
"78 Sup. Ct. 1302 (1958).
5 "This cannot be denied on the claim that such
state law of immunity may expose the potential witness
to prosecution under federal law. See Jack v. Kansas,
199 U.S. 372." 78 Sup. Ct. at 1307.
8Barron v. Baltimore, footnote 54 supra.
6 "Certainly there is nothing in the language nor in
the history of the Constitutional provisions which dic
tates an answer either way upon the question whether
the protection should extent to prosecution under
'foreign' law. Judges who consider that the policy
behind the privilege is so salutary that the range of its
application should be extended, will be inclined to
accord protection when the danger of 'foreign' prosecu-
tion is clear." McCoRmicic, EVIDENCE § 124 (1954).
6Though this re-affirmance is certainly dictum.
"If a person may, through immunized self-
disclosure before a law-enforcing .agency of the
state, facilitate to some extent his amenability to
federal process, or vice versa, this too is a price to
be paid for our federalism." (Emphasis added.)
But this vice versa argument of federalism ignores
several basic points. It is true that a state does
not have to provide immunity from federal prose-
cution. But this is only true because a state cannot
provide such immunity,6t and because a state does
not have to provide any privilege against self-
incrimination, 62 and even if it does it may con-
strue its grant not to recognize the possibility of
incrimination under another jurisdiction, for a
state court is, after all, the final arbiter of what its
own privilege against self-incrimination encom-
passes. This argument does not apply in reverse,
however, as those who weave the magic spell of
federalism would have it do. The federal govern-
ment can provide immunity from state prosecu-
tions,6 and the federal government must recognize
the privilege against self-incrimination." How far
that privilege then extends becomes a policy
question, not a constitutional one which the
"essence of a constitutionally formulated federal-
ism" compels.
Murdock, by his testimony before a federal
agency, did not merely "facilitate to some extent
his amenability to state process." He was obliged
to give testimony that would, in fact, be enough to
secure his conviction in a state court. 65 If this is
the "price to be paid for our federalism," then,
under our present federal and state criminal
investigatory "and prosecution procedures, it is
submitted that the price is too high.
It is hoped that the Supreme Court will soon
have occasion to examine once more the validity
of the "two sovereignties" rule, a rule which finds
support neither in the language of the Constitution
nor in reason and justice, and that the Court will
see fit to abandon once and for all a rule which
ignores the realities of a twentieth century
America."
61 U.S. CoNsT. art. 6, § 2.
6Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 243 (1908).
6Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), Ullmann
v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
6" U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
"See footnote 38, supra and Feldman v. United
States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944).66 An examination of the concurring and dissenting
opinions in Xnapp v. Schweitzer, 78 Sup. Ct. 1302
(1958) indicates that at least the four votes required for
certiorari will be available in any case which provides
the basis for a re-appraisal of the Murdock doctrine.
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